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One of the simplest social choice problems has a group of individuals to decide between 
two alternatives. Each individual reports whether he or she prefers one alternative to the 
other or whether he or she is indifferent between them. Given the preferences revealed 
by the individuals, a social welfare function (SWF) determines a collective preference, 
which, if strict, can then be used to choose one of the alternatives. The majority rule is 
probably the most popular SWF. To May (1952, p. 682) is due the benchmark 
characterization, based on axioms of neutrality, anonymity, and monotonicity. 
 
This paper suggests three axioms and identifies all the SWFs satisfying them. The first 
axiom is unanimity: if all the preferences reported by the individuals are the same, then 
the SWF outputs that common preference as the collective preference. The second 
axiom is reducibility: the aggregation of the preferences of n individuals is the result of 
aggregating first two different preferences into one and aggregating next this preference 
and the remaining n  2 preferences. Postulated to characterize the majority rule, the 
axioms of weak path independence in Aşan and Sanver (2002, p. 411) and reducibility 
to subsocieties in Woeginger (2003, p. 90) also make the aggregation of a preference 
profile depend on the aggregation of subprofiles. The last axiom is substitutability: the 
collective preference of group I is not altered by replacing a member i of I with an 
individual j not belonging to I and assigning i’s preference to j. 
 
The result in this paper, Proposition 3.3, shows that those three axioms characterize a 
set of twelve SWFs, which can be divided into four types: the majority rule, a twisted 
majority rule in which a specific strict preference is considered an indifference and vice 
versa, the dictated rules (rules that are, essentially, constant), and the hierarchically 
dictated rules (in which the aggregation is determined by a fixed priority ranking among 
the three admissible collective preferences). Hence, the above three axioms solely lead 
to SWFs based on (i) the principle of the majority, (ii) dictated outcomes (a certain 
preference is almost always chosen), or (iii) priorities among outcomes. 
 
 
2. Definitions and axioms 
 
Members of the set ℕ of positive integers are names for individuals. A society is a non-
empty finite subset of ℕ. The set of alternatives or candidates is {, }, with   . A 
preference over {, } is represented by a number from the set {1, 0, 1}. If the number 
is 1,  is preferred to ; if 1,  is preferred to ; if 0,  is indifferent to . A preference 
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profile for society I is a function pI : I  {1, 0, 1} assigning a preference over {, } 
to each member of I. For preference profile pI and i  I, pi abbreviates pI(i). The set P is 
the set of all preference profiles pI such that I is a society. For n  ℕ, Pn = {pI  P: I has 
n members}. For pI  P and J  I, the restriction pJ of pI to society J is the member qJ 
of P such that, for all i  J, qi = pi. For society I and a  {1, 0, 1}, (a
I) represents the 
preference profile pI such that, for all i  I, pi = a. When I = {i}, a
i stands for a
{i}. For 
disjoint societies I and J, and preference profiles pI and qJ, (pI, qJ) designates the profile 
rIJ such that, for all i  I, ri = pi and, for all i  J, ri = qi.  
 
Definition 2.1. A social welfare function (SWF) is a mapping f : P  {1, 0, 1}. 
 
A SWF takes as input the preferences over {, } of all the members of a given society 
I and outputs a preference over {, } attributed to society I. Specifically, for p  P: (i) 
f(pI) = 1 means that, according to f, society I prefers  to ; (ii) f(pI) = 1, that society I 
prefers  to ; and (iii) f(pI) = 0, that society I is indifferent between  and . For a  
{1, 0, 1} and pI  P, define na(pI) to be the number of members of the set {i  I: pi = 
a}, that is, the number of individuals having preference a in preference profile pI.  
 
Definition 2.2. The majority rule is the SWF  such that, for all pI  P: (i) if n1(pI) > 
n1(pI), then (pI) = 1; (ii) if n1(pI) < n1(pI), then (pI) = 1; and (iii) if n1(pI) = n1(pI), 
then (pI) = 0. 
 
Definition 2.3. For a  {1, 1}, the 0/a-myopic majority rule is the SWF 
0/a such that, 
for all pI  P: (i) na(pI) > n0(pI) implies 
0/a(pI) = a; (ii) na(pI) < n0(pI) implies 
0/a(pI) 
= 0; and (iii) na(pI) = n0(pI) implies 





The 0/a-myopic majority rule 
0/a can be seen as the majority rule in which a means 













k) = 1. 
 
Definition 2.4. A SWF f is hierarchically dictated if there is a linear ordering (a, b, c) on 
the set {1, 0, 1} such that, for all pI  P: (i) if a  {pi}iI, then f(pI) = a; (ii) if a  
{pi}iI and b  {pi}iI, then f(pI) = b; and (iii) if a  {pi}iI and b  {pi}iI, then f(pI) = 
c. 
 
Definition 2.5. A SWF f is dictated if there is a  {1, 0, 1} such that, for all pI  P, 
f(pI) = a unless, for some b  {1, 0, 1}, pI = (b
I), in which case f(pI) = b. 
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In a hierarchically dictated SWF there is a ranking (a,  b, c) of the three collective 
preferences 1, 0, and 1 such that: (i) when some individual has preference a, the SWF 
chooses a as the collective preference; (ii) when no individual holds preference a, but 
some holds b, then b is the collective preference; and (iii) otherwise, c is the preference 
of all the individuals, which then becomes the collective preference. A dictated SWF 
always outputs the same collective preference unless all the individuals have the same 
preference, in which case that common preference defines the collective preference.  
 
U. Unanimity. For every society I and each a  {1, 0, 1}, f(a
I) = a.  
 
U states that if all the individuals in society I have the same preference, then that 
preference is the preference attributed to society I. 
 
R. Reducibility. For all pI  P\(P1  P2), i  I, and j  I\{i}, if pi  pj, then, for all k  
{i, j}, f(pI) = f(pI\{i,j}, f(p{i,j})
k). 
 
R is motivated by the idea of reducing the aggregation of non-unanimous preferences to 
the aggregation of unanimous preferences. According to R, f(pI) can be obtained as 
follows: take any two different preferences pi and pj from pI; remove them from pI; 
aggregate them into f(pi, pj); choose a representative k for, and from, the society {i, j}; 
attribute  f(pi,  pj) to k; aggregate preferences pI\{i,j} and preference f(pi,  pj) of k. 
Successive application of R ensures that a preference profile in which all the 
preferences are identical will be reached, in which case U can be invoked. 
 
For pI  P, i  I, and j  ℕ\{i}, pI
ij abbreviates (pI\{i,j}, (pi)
j, (pj)
i) if j  I and (pI\{i}, 
(pi)
j) if j  I. When j  I, pI
ij is the preference profile obtained from pI by permuting 
the preferences of individuals i and j. When j  I, pI
ij is the profile obtained from pI by 
removing i from I, adding j, and ascribing to j the preference pi held by i in pI. 
 
S. Substitutability (inter-anonymity). For all pI  P, i  I, and j  ℕ\I, f(pI) = f(pI
ij). 
 
A. Anonymity. For all pI  P, i  I, and j  ℕ\{i}, f(pI) = f(pI
ij). 
 
A asserts that the collective preference does not depend on the identity of the members 
of the society: the collective preference is not altered by exchanging the preferences of 
two members of the society (intra-anonymity) or by replacing a member of the society 
with an individual not in the society (inter-anonymity). S just postulates the second 
possibility: for all pI  P, i  I and j  ℕ\I, f(pI) = f(pI\{i}, (pi)
j). 




Remark 3.1. S implies A (with k  ℕ\I, f(pi, pj, pI\{i,j}) = f(pi, (pj)
k, pI\{i, j}) = f((pi)
j, (pj)
k, 
pI\{i, j}) = f((pi)
j, (pj)
i, pI\{i, j})). 
 
By Remark 3.1, when S holds, the SWF is anonymous. Hence, one can then dispense 





j). This convention is followed in Table I (where, for example, f(1, 1) 




j), for all i  ℕ and j  ℕ\{i}). 
 
Lemma 3.2. If a social welfare function f satisfies U, R, and S, then only the twelve 
cases represented in Table I as columns 1-12 are possible. 
 
Table I. The twelve ways of assigning value to (a, b), with a  b, given U, R, and S 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
f(1, 1)  0 0 1 1 1 1 1  1  1  1  1  1 
f(1, 0)  1  0  0  1  1 1 1 0 0 0 1  1 
f(1, 0)  1  0 0 0 0 1  1 0  1 1  1  1 
 
Proof. By Remark 3.1, f assigns the same value to all the preference profiles abbreviated 
by (1, 1) and (1, 1), no matter the identity of the individuals. This value is represented 
by the second row in Table I. The same applies to all the preference profiles (1, 0) and 
(0, 1), whose common value appears in the third row, and to all the preference profiles 
(1, 0) and (0, 1), whose common value is in the fourth row. 
 
 Case 1: f(1, 1) = 0. It will be shown that this case generates columns 1-2 in Table I. 
 
Case 1a: f(1, 0) = 1.Case 1a1: f(1, 0) = 1. The corresponding values constitute column 
1. Case 1a2: f(1, 0)  1. By R, f(1, 0, 1) = f(f(1, 0), 1) = f(1, 1) = 0. This and R 
imply 0 = f(1, 0, 1) = f(1, f(1, 0)). If f(1, 0) = 0, then f(1, f(1, 0)) = f(1, 0) = 1: 
contradiction. If f(1, 0) = 1, then, by U, f(1, f(1, 0)) = f(1, 1) = 1: contradiction. 
 
Case 1b: f(1, 0) = 1. By R and U, f(1, 1, 0) = f(1, f(1, 0)) = f(1, 1) = 1. By R and 
U, f(1, 1, 0) = f(f(1, 1), 0) = f(0, 0) = 0: contradiction. 
 
Case 1c: f(1, 0) = 0. By R and U, f(1, 1, 0) = f(f(1, 1), 0) = f(0, 0) = 0. By R, 0 = f(1, 
1, 0) = f(1, f(1, 0)) = f(1, 0). This set of values defines column 2. 
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 Case 2: f(1, 1) = 1. This case generates columns 3-7 in Table I. 
 
Case 2a: f(1, 0) = 0. By R, f(1, 1, 0) = f(f(1, 1), 0) = f(1, 0) = 0. By R, 0 = f(1, 1, 0) = 
f(1, f(1, 0)) = f(1, 0). This defines the case represented as column 3. 
 
Case 2b: f(1, 0) = 1. By R, f(1, 1, 0) = f(f(1, 1), 0) = f(1, 0) = 1. If f(1, 0) = 1, 
then, by R, 1 = f(1, 1, 0) = f(f(1, 0), 1) = f(1, 1) = 1: contradiction. If f(1, 0) = 1, 
then, by R and U, 1 = f(1, 1, 0) = f(f(1, 0), 1) = f(1, 1) = 1: contradiction. As a result, 
f(1, 0) = 0, which defines the case displayed as column 4. 
 
Case 2c: f(1, 0) = 1. When f(1, 0) = 0, column 5 obtains. When f(1, 0) = 1, it is 
column 6 that obtains. And when f(1, 0) = 1, it is column 7. 
 
 Case 3: f(1, 1) = 1. This case generates columns 8-12 in Table I. 
 
Case 3a: f(1, 0) = 0. Having f(1, 0) = 0 leads to column 8; f(1, 0) = 1, to column 9; 
and f(1, 0) = 1, to column 10. 
 
Case 3b: f(1, 0) = 1. By R, f(1, 1, 0) = f(1, f(1, 0)) = f(1, 1) = 1. By R, 1 = f(1, 1, 
0) = f(f(1, 1), 0) = f(1, 0). These values give rise to column 11. 
 
Case 3c: f(1, 0) = 1. By R and U, f(1, 1, 0) = f(1, f(1, 0)) = f(1, 1) = 1. By R, 1 
= f(1, 1, 0) = f(f(1, 1), 0) = f(1, 0). These values define column 12. 
 
Proposition 3.3. A social welfare function f satisfies U, R, and S if and only if f is the 
majority rule, a 0-myopic majority rule, hierarchically dictated, or dictated (a total of 
twelve social welfare functions). 
 
Proof. “” For every SWF f of the four types indicated, f(pI) does not depend on the 
identity of the individuals, so S holds in all cases. It is not difficult to verify that U also 
holds. With respect to R, it is satisfied by a dictated SWF, since any two different 
preferences are always collapsed into the same preference. As regards a hierarchically 
dictated SWF, suppose the associated linear order is (a, b, c). Consider any pI  P. If a 
is present in pI, then, no matter how preferences are integrated, the aggregate preference 
is a. If a is not present but b is, then, no matter how preferences are integrated, the 
aggregate preference is b. And, finally, if neither a nor b is present, pI = (c, … , c), in 
which case R imposes no constraint. 
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To show that  satisfies R, choose pI  P, i  I, and j  I\{i} such that pi  pj. Let a  
{1, 1}. If {pi, pj} = {a, a}, then (p{i,j}) = 0. Accordingly, for all k  {i, j}, (pI) = 
(pI\{i,j}, 0
k) = (pI\{i,j}, (p{i,j})
k). If {pi, pj} = {0, a}, then (p{i,j}) = a. Consequently, for 
all k  {i, j}, (pI) = (pI\{i,j}, a
k) = (pI\{i,j}, (p{i,j})
k), because (pI\{i,j}, a
k) is obtained 
from pI by removing a component equal to zero and, possibly, renaming an individual. 
Lastly, 0-myopic majority rules satisfy R because each such rule is a majority rule with 
a reinterpretation of symbols: whereas indifference is represented by 0 in , it is 
represented by a in the myopic version 
0/a; and the strict preference designated by a in 
 becomes represented by 0 in the myopic version.
 
“” By Lemma 3.2, for a  b, f(a, b) can only take values according to the columns in 
Table I. Part 1: column 1 implies f = . By U, f =  on P1. By U and column 1, f =  on 
P2. Taking f =  on P1  P2 as the base case of an induction argument, choose n > 2 and 
suppose that f =  on P1  …  Pn1. To show that f =  on Pn, choose pI  Pn. If all the 
components of pI are the same, then, by U, f(pI) = (pI). If two components pi and pj of 
pI are different, then, by R, f(pI) = f(pI\{i,j}, f(p{i,j})
i). By the induction hypothesis, f(pI\{i,j}, 
f(p{i,j})
i) = (pI\{i,j}, (p{i,j})
i). Since  satisfies R, (pI\{i,j}, (p{i,j})
i) = (pI). 
 
Part 2: column 2 makes f be the dictated SWF with dictated value 0 (this is the 
unanimity rule, which outputs 0 when not all the preferences are the same, and, when all 
the preferences are the same, outputs that preference). Let pI  P. If all the components 
of pI are the same, then, by U, f(pI) is that common preference. If not all the components 
are the same, then, being 0 the absorbing preference, the pairwise aggregation of 
preferences eventually generates the profile (0, … , 0), which, by U, is aggregated into 
0. 
 
Part 3: column 3 implies that f is the hierarchically dictated SWF f with ordering  = 
(0, 1, 1). U attributes values in a way consistent with . Since the values of column 3 
are also consistent with , f = f on P1  P2. For the rest of profiles, notice that 0 
absorbs both 1 and 1, because f(1, 0) = 0 and f(1, 0) = 0. Therefore, if 0 is in the 
profile, the pairwise aggregation of preferences eventually leads to the profile (0, … , 
0), which, by U, is aggregated into 0. If 0 is not in the profile but 1 is, then f(1, 1) = 1 
implies that the pairwise aggregation of preferences eventually leads to a profile of the 
sort (1, … , 1), which, by U, is aggregated into 1. And if neither 0 nor 1 appears in the 
profile, it must be (1, … , 1), which, by U, is aggregated into 1. 
 
Part 4: column 4 implies f = 
0/1. Let pI  P. If n1(pI) > n0(pI), then, thanks to R and f(1, 
0) = 1, every 0 can be paired with some 1, so that every such pair (1, 0) becomes 1. 
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Since n1(pI) > n0(pI), some 1 remains unmatched. As f(1, 1) = 1, value 1 absorbs value 
1. Accordingly, the application of R will eventually generate a profile of the sort (1, … 
, 1), which, by U, is aggregated into 1. In sum, f(pI) = 1 = 
0/1(pI). If n1(pI) < n0(pI), 
then, by an analogous reasoning, it is some 0 that survives the process of aggregating all 
the 1s. Given that f(1, 0) = 1, the removal of 1s by combining them with 0s generates 
1s. Since f(1, 0) = 0 and there is some 0, R leads to the profile (0, … , 0), which, by 
U, becomes 0 = 
0/1(pI). Finally, if n1(pI) = n0(pI), every pair (1, 0) is transformed into 
1, so all the 1s and all the 0s eventually cancel out. Hence, R yields a string of 1s, 
which, by U, is aggregated into 1 = 
0/1(pI). 
 
Part 5: column 5 implies that f is the hierarchically dictated SWF with ordering (1, 0, 
1). The proof mimics that of part 3 (now, 1 absorbs both 1 and 0, whereas 0 absorbs 
1). 
 
Part 6: column 6 makes f be the dictated SWF with dictated value 1. This is like part 2 
with 1 replacing 0. 
 
Part 7: column 7 implies that f is the hierarchically dictated SWF with ordering (1, 1, 
0). The proof mimics that of part 3 (1 absorbs both 1 and 0, whereas 1 absorbs 0). 
 
Part 8: column 8 implies that f is the hierarchically dictated SWF with ordering (0, 1, 
1). The proof mimics that of part 3 (0 absorbs both 1 and 1, whereas 1 absorbs 1). 
 
Part 9: column 9 implies f = 
0/1. Let pI  P. If n1(pI) > n0(pI), then, thanks to R and 
f(1, 0) = 1, every 0 can be paired with some 1, so that every such pair (1, 0) 
becomes 1. Since n1(pI) > n0(pI), some 1 remains unmatched. As f(1, 1) = 1, value 
1 absorbs value 1. Accordingly, the application of R will eventually generate the 
profile (1, … , 1), which, by U, is aggregated into 1. In sum, f(pI) = 1 = 
0/1(pI). If 
n1(pI) < n0(pI), then, by an analogous reasoning, it is some 0 that survives the process 
of aggregating all the 1s. Given that f(1, 0) = 1, the removal of 1s by combining 
them with 0s generates 1s. Since f(1, 0) = 0 and there is some 0, R leads to the profile 
(0, … , 0), which, by U, is transformed into 0 = 
0/1(pI). Finally, if n1(pI) = n0(pI), every 
pair (1, 0) is transformed into 1, so all the 1s and all the 0s eventually cancel out. 
Hence, R yields a string of 1s, which, by U, is aggregated into 1 = 
0/1(pI). 
 
Part 10: column 10 implies that f is the hierarchically dictated SWF with ordering (1, 
0, 1). The proof mimics that of part 3 (1 absorbs both 0 and 1, whereas 0 absorbs 1). 
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Part 11: column 11 implies that f is the hierarchically dictated SWF with ordering (1, 
1, 0). The proof mimics that of part 3 (1 absorbs both 1 and 0, whereas 1 absorbs 0). 
 
Part 12: if f takes the values from column 12 in Table I, then f is the dictated SWF 
whose dictated value is 1. This is like part 2 with 1 replacing 0. 
 
Remark 3.4. No axiom in Proposition 3.3 is redundant. 
 
The SWF f such that, for all pI  P, f(pI) = 0 satisfies R and S, but not U. Let * be the 
absolute majority rule: (i) n1(pI) > n1(pI) + n0(pI) implies *(pI) = 1; (ii) n1(pI) > n1(pI) 
+ n0(pI) implies *(pI) = 1; and (iii) otherwise, *(pI) = 0. Then * satisfies U and S, 
but not R (1 = *(1, 1, 1)  *(1, *(1, 1)) = *(1, 0) = 0). Finally, let f be the SWF 
such that, for all pI  P, f(pI) = 0, except that: (i) f(1
1, 0




2) = 1; and (iii) for each society I and a  {1, 1}, f(a
I) = a. Then f satisfies 
both U and R, but not S. 
 
Given Proposition 3.3, it should not be difficult to provide an axiomatic characterization 
of the majority rule by just adding some axiom or axioms inconsistent with the 
remaining eleven SWFs. Quesada (2011) provides one such characterization. 
Proposition 3.3 can also be compared with the results in Quesada (2012), where the 
SWFs that are characterized jointly with the majority rule are based on priorities over 
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